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Finality in Collective Bargaining Disputes: The New
York Experience
Victor Gotbaum*
In 1969, the New York State Legislature, apparently irritated by several large-
scale public employee strikes in New York City, required' the city council to
amend the city's collective bargaining statutes so as to be "substantially equiva-
lent" with the "finality" provisions of the state public employee bargaining
law, the Taylor Act. 2 Prior to January 1972, the city's bargaining laws con-
tained no formal provision for finality in public labor disputes.' Pursuant to
this statutory mandate, the city council included formal finality in its bargain-
ing mechanism.
In light of the Taylor Act experience and the overwhelming success of the
existing city provisions, this action by the state legislature was ill-advised and
inappropriate. However, the New York City Council, to its credit, devised a
statutory scheme which, at worst, minimized the disadvantages of binding final-
* B.A., Brooklyn College; M.I.A., Columbia University. Executive Director, District Council
37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO.
I. The Public Employee's Fair Employment Act, N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 212(1 1) (McKinney
Supp. 1969). The New York State Senate, in its Rules Committee Report, noted that:
[tihe legislation is aimed at providing greater deterrents against strikes and disruption
of vital public services by public employees. . . . [Slome unions have eagerly accepted
the Taylor Law's privileges while rejecting its responsibilities.
N.Y. SEss. LAWS 2366 (McKinney 1969).
The five major strikes in New York City over the past four years were the 1968 transit strike,
the 1968 sanitation walk-out, the teachers' strike in 1968, the 1970 police wildcat strike, and the
1971 AFSCME strike. Not one of these strikes had anything to do with the disputes-settlement
machinery in the city or state laws. Further, not one of these strikes would have been affected by
the existen& of finality provisions.
2. The Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW. See Koretz, Labor
Relations Law, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 258 (1969); Kheel, The Taylor Law: A Critical Examination
of Its Virtues and Defects, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181 (1969). In approving the bill, Governor
Rockefeller stated that:
This legislation ushers in a new age of public employee relations in New York State. [The
Act] proclaims the rights of government employees, yet recognizes the special obligations
borne by those who provide the vital services of government.
3. New York City Collective Bargaining Law, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 54 (Williams Supp.
1965).
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ity by providing for an impartial mechanism as the final step in place of the
public employer in that role.
It is the purpose of this article to illustrate the significant difference between
these two formulations of the finality concept in public bargaining disputes.
Since New York City accounts for half of the state's population, their separate
experiences with respect to finality that have existed to date and the additional
experience that will emerge as a result of the recent amendments to the city's
collective bargaining law may prove highly instructive.
The State
In formulating the Taylor Act, the state legislature rejected bilateral bargaining
between employer and employee. Instead, a "collective negotiations" procedure
was substituted.4 The use of the term "collective negotiations" and the nature
of the finality provisions show that the drafters of the Taylor Act did not intend
to establish a viable method of bargaining for public employees. Their intention
was, rather, "to supply the participation of public employees in the determina-
tion of some of their conditions of employment." ' One noted commentator has
maintained that this process grants employees merely the right to consultation
in labor disputes, amounting to a "unilateral determination" by the public
employer when agreement cannot be reached. 6
The success of any bargaining procedure requires that those who are affected
believe that it is an equitable method for resolving their disputes.7 This is
achieved in the private sector by the intervention of the government, a neutral
party, in the form of the National Labor Relations Board.' In New York,
however, the state legislature was faced with the dilemma of achieving a restric-
tion of negotiating rights while seeking public approval and acceptance of the
Act. The solution was found in the concept of finality.
Put briefly, the Taylor Act provides that, after "collective negotiations" and
a fact-finder's recommendation that there can be no agreement, the "legislative
body of the government involved" is empowered to determine the final employ-
ment condition terms.' The ultimate decision in public employment conflicts is
placed in a branch of the employer-the state legislature, city council, or local
4. Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209.
5. FINAl. REPORT, STATE OF N.Y. GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS II (March
31, 1966).
6. T. KHEEL, REPORT TO SPEAKER ANTHONY J. TRAVIA ON THE TAYLOR LAW 3 (Feb. 21, 1968).
7. HANT, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE (1961); SPERO, GOVERN-
MENT AS EMPLOYER (1948).
8. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1935).
9. Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(e).
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school board. In other words, after inconclusive consultations, a unilateral
determination of rights is made. Asserting that this procedure is distinctly more
advantageous to the public employee than the previous policy of absolute state
dictation of employment terms, advocates of the Taylor Act are quick to point
to the many agreements reached under its provisions as an indicia of its success.
However, no serious observer can view the dispute resolution techniques of the
Act as anything but a total negation of the concept of collective bargaining.
Three recent cases illustrate the Act's predominant tendency to favor the public
employer.
In 1964, New York State engaged in extended collective negotiations with
District Council 82 of the American Federation of State, County, and Munici-
pal Employees (AFSCME), the unit acting on behalf of the state correction
officers. An impasse in negotiations was reached. One of the issues submitted
to the statutory fact-finder was whether the officers should be reallocated to a
higher pay grade. The governor, representing the state, rejected the fact-finder's
favorable recommendation on this issue. Under the Taylor Act, the matter was
referred to the final arbiter (here, the state legislature). Predictably, the legisla-
ture split along party lines; since the governor's party was in the majority, the
fact-finder's recommendations were rejected and the governor's decision up-
held. Shortly thereafter, the same majority amended the Taylor Act to exclude
the issue of salary grade allocations from negotiation considerations.
This case is by no means isolated. By granting the determination of finality
to a legislative body, the Taylor Act makes every labor grievance a political
question. Another example highlights the state's lack of concern for the rights
of its employees. In 1970 the firemen of Albany began to organize into bargain-
ing units and met with vigorous opposition from that city's mayor, even to the
extent of coercion and discrimination designed to prevent the city's employees
from exercising their basic negotiation rights. Shortly after the firemen began
agitating for their rights, the non-organized city policemen, with whom the
firemen had long shared salary parity, were granted a substantial pay increase.
Despite the mayor's hostility, the Albany firemen succeeded in organizing and
began collective negotiations with the city. At the negotiation table, the mayor's
chief "concession" was to allow the firemen to continue on their jobs without
an increase. This, of course, resulted in a stalemate.
Accordingly, the issue was submitted .to a fact-finder, who recommended that
the firefighters be granted an increase substantially equivalent to that received
by the policemen. The mayor rejected this recommendation.
Once more the stage was set for invoking the finality mechanism of the
Taylor Act. The dispute would be determined by the legislative body of the
government involved-the Albany Common Council. The council's decision
was identical to that of the mayor-no increase for firefighters. This example
1972]
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of the Taylor Law's finality provisions was so embarassing and outrageous
that the state's Public Employee Relations Board (PERB)0 intervened and
attempted to carve out an extra-legal role for itself." The Board summoned
the parties before it for the purpose of making its own recommendations. The
City of Albany, however, quickly responded by obtaining a court order declar-
ing that PERB was without jurisdiction in the matter. Since public employees
are forbidden to strike in New York, the Albany firemen had no recourse but
to submit to this politically motivated decision.
A more serious infringement of public employees' rights occurs when the
public union is involved in a dispute with a school board. All school boards in
New York are both a "government" and a "public employer" within the
meaning of the Taylor Act.' 3 However, unlike the usual governmental body,
there is no separation of powers into executive and legislative branches; persons
serving on the board act in both capacities.
In November 1971, the Yonkers School Board and the Teachers Union
reached an impasse over salary negotiations; the matter was submitted to the
fact-finder who determined that the union should be granted a 5.4 percent
increase. 4 The board members, in their executive capacity, rejected the recom-
mendations. The rejection was then submitted to the appropriate legislative
body-the Yonkers School Board! Shedding their executive raiments and don-
ning legislative robes, the board members deliberated and decided that they
were compelled by the logic of the executive board to agree with that body's
10. The Public Employment Relations Board was established by the Taylor Act. It is a three-
man body, appointed by the Governor, entrusted with the duty of resolving representation and
negotiation difficulties in collective bargaining disputes.
II. The Public Employment Relations Board issued an order on January 13, 1971, requiring
the city and the firefighters to show cause before it at a public hearing why they should not be
directed to comply with the previous Board order to enter into collective negotiations and conclude
a written agreement or alternatively to accept recommendations made by the fact-finding panel set
up to help resolve the dispute.
12. City of Albany v. Helsbury, 65 Misc. 2d 28, 317 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. Albany 1971).
The city argued that it had complied with the Board's first order requiring collective negotiations
and that disagreement between the parties made a written agreement impossible. It therefore argued
that since the § 209 provisions of the Taylor Law for impasse resolution were exhausted, the proper
party to pass judgment would be the City Council, not PERB.
The court accepted the City's position, despite argument by PERB that the language of
§ 205(5)() gave it the power "to hold such hearings and make such inquiries as it deems
necessary for it properly to carry out its functions and powers." The court said this authority
referred only to powers specifically granted under the law and since a continuing impasse after
rejection of the fact-finding report was to be settled by the appropriate legislative body, the Board's
powers were at an end.
13. Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 201(6)(a). "The term 'government' or 'public em-
ployer' means . . . (iii) a school district or any governmental entity operating a public school,
college or university ....
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determination."
The teachers' union, however, was not so compelled. 5 In violation of the law,
they struck.'" The strike was finally settled by hard, good-faith bargaining
before an impartial mediator, not by recourse to the Taylor Act."
The history of collective bargaining under the Taylor Act is a sad one,
marked by political maneuvering, intimidation, and deprivation of employee
rights. In marked contrast is the New York City experience.
The City
It was generally recognized when the Taylor Act was passed in 1967 that its
provisions simply were not appropriate to the New York City public labor
scene. Vigorous employee unions were firmly established in the city; many of
these organizations had had searing experiences with third-party mechanisms
appointed by the mayor. s
As a result, ad hoc tri-partite discussions were held and an equitable proce-
dure agreed upon for selecting a seven-man Board of Collective Bargaining."
As specified in the Administrative Code, the mayor and the Municipal Labor
Committee, acting for the unions, appoint two representatives each; these four
individuals, in turn, agree upon the three other members. This impartial, con-
sensual approach to dispute bargaining was also evident in the procedures for
appointing fact-finders and arbitration panels. Further, salaries and expenses
of the impartial members were shared equally by the city and by the Municipal
Labor Committee. Thus, equitable procedures were insured for each step in the
representation and bargaining process.
14. N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1971, at 47, col. 6 (city ed.).
15. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1971, at 32, col. 6 (city ed.). Besides the salary dispute, the other
major issue involved a limitation on maximum class size on which the teachers claimed they would
not compromise.
16. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1972, at I, col. 3. Despite a temporary restraining order granted to
the school board by State Supreme Court Judge George Belsheim, Jr., the teachers union struck.
Both sides agreed the strike was 90 percent effective, as only 168 of 1,859 teachers crossed the
lines. Later the school board obtained an injunction which the teachers also ignored. "Eugene Fox,
the Yonkers Corporation Counsel, said the city would then seek to bring contempt proceedings
against the teachers as soon as possible. The board will seek to invoke the other penalty outlined
by the Taylor Law, including a fine of two days salary for each day of the strike." However, no
such action was ever taken.
17. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1972, at 35, col. 1, continued at 39, col. 1.
18. New York City Mayor Robert F. Wagner, in Exec. Order No. 49 (1958), established the
City's affirmative policy of encouraging city employees to join unions and to engage in collective
bargaining. However, the 1965 Welfare Department employees' strike focused the attention of the
city and its employees on the inadequacies inherent in the existing mayoral-controlled system.
19. NEW YORK CITY MEMORANDUM OF THE TRIPARTITE PANEL TO IMPROVE MUNICIPAL
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCEDURES (1966).
19721
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This example of cooperation proved to be a highly viable system of bargain-
ing. In its four years of operation, 49 stalemated disputes were referred to a
fact-finder. In each case, the city accepted the fact-finder's recommendation;
in all but a few situations, the union also accepted. As for the few fact-finding
reports that were rejected by the unions, the city stood fast and the union, after
reconsideration, acquiesced to the fact-finder. A study of this record leads to
the conclusion that the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, based on
the consent and acceptance of the city and the unions, represented a highly
effective de facto finality mechanism.
In light of this exemplary record, it would seem that the governor and the
state legislature should have been pleased to allow the city to continue under
its enlightened procedures. But enamored by the Taylor formula of unilateral
finality, the legislature insisted that the city adopt a system "substantially
equivalent" to the Taylor provisions .
2
While the New York City Council does not have a record of venality compa-
rable to the Common Council of Albany, its actions are certainly as politically
motivated as those of the state legislature. Recognizing this and the shameful
history of the Taylor Act, there was widespread agreement in New York City
that an in toto adoption of the Act's finality provisions would be disastrous.
Accordingly, an alternative method of finality was sought and found. While
this mechanism avoids the undesirable political and unilateral provisions of the
Taylor Act, it suffers from its formal recognition of finality. In short, when an
impasse occurs in the bargaining negotiations, a fact-finder, acceptable to both
sides, is appointed by the Board of Collective Bargaining to make recommenda-
tions for the resolution of the dispute. If either party rejects the recommenda-
tions, the matter is submitted to the tri-partite Board for final determination.
On paper, this mechanism differs in only one respect: it introduces finality into
the Board's decision. While there is not as yet any data concerning the success
of the new law, any system of binding arbitration is usually found undesirable
by labor. New York City public labor unions, if they had been given a choice,
would have preferred the existing and highly effective de facto finality to this
new procedure.
Nonetheless, this new mechanism is superior to the Taylor formula of legisla-
tive determination. To have allowed the final determination of labor disputes
to be made by the New York City Council would have been irresponsible and
ill-advised.
20. The Public Employees' Fair Employment Law, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 212(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1969).
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Conclusion
The future of collective bargaining in New York City is bright. As the unions
and city government gain experience, an ever larger percentage of disputes will
be settled by hard bargaining without recourse to the impasse mechanism.
Further, since the impartiality of the fact-finding procedures has been accepted
and remains unimpaired, most stalemated disputes will be settled. In those
relatively few cases where the recommendations are rejected, the Board of
Collective Bargaining can be expected to uphold the fact-finder.
These new procedures may not affect the number of public employee strikes
in New York City. Strikes cannot be prevented by this or any other mechan-
ism in a free society. But the New York City law does provide labor and
management with a neutral forum in which to fairly and equitably resolve
their differences. The interests of both sides are protected, with neither sub-
ordinated to the other. Public employees are no longer relegated to the status
of second class citizens merely because they work for the state. The New York
state legislature can and should learn a valuable lesson in public employee
relations from New York City.
19721
